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Environmental Change, Protest, and
Havens of Environmental Degradation:
Evidence from Asia
Derek Hall*
As has been made clear by the other contributions to this debate, much of one’s
analysis of the question of “pollution havens” depends upon how one frames
the question. While I do not wish to repeat the arguments that have been made
by the preceding authors, I would like to suggest that it is useful to characterize
the literature in economics on pollution havens in terms of its choices among
two independent variables and three dependent variables. In seeking to identify
which environmental factors might inuence the global economy, scholars have
generally focused on either expenditures on pollution abatement or on the rela-
tive “dirtiness” of different industries (generally measured in terms of toxic
emissions). In order to determine the effects of these causal factors, most au-
thors have examined intercountry differences in industrial structure, trade ows,
and foreign direct investment (FDI). It is thus possible to place much of the lit-
erature within a 2x3 grid based on the choices made within this menu of inde-
pendent and dependent variables. Lucas, Wheeler, and Hettige, for instance,
have studied the effect of toxic emissions on industrial structure, while Tobey
has investigated the effects of environmental compliance costs on patterns of
trade.1De re k H l lEnvi onmental Change, Protest,  and Havens of Environmental Degradation
It is important to recognize, however, that the questions posed within this
grid do not exhaust the research questions that are relevant to the study of pol-
lution havens. A broader framing of the question underlying the debate might
go as follows: to what extent do the environmental transformations associated
with particular sectors inuence their international siting patterns? Posing the
question in this way would move the debate away from the questions of
intentionality and regulatory costs addressed in this issue by David Wheeler
(while still, of course, encompassing them) and towards the consequences, an-
ticipated and otherwise, of environmental degradation. This article attempts to
Global Environmental Politics 2:2, May 2002
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1. Lucas, Wheeler, and Hettige 1992; and Tobey 1990. My characterization of the literature differs
slightly from that of Neumayer 2001, 149.
address new aspects of this broader question by departing from the existing lit-
erature in two ways. First, I address the consequences for international siting
patterns of another aspect of environmental transformations: environmentally-
oriented protest. While protest often results in tightened regulatory conditions,
it also affects rms by creating non-regulatory difculties in the actual siting and
construction of plants and by generating uncertainty about future regulation.
The connections between environmentally-oriented protest and the actual envi-
ronmental problems caused by different sectors are not, of course, air-tight; it is
possible that protesters are in fact mistaken about the environmental degrada-
tion that they perceive industry to be causing. In this article, I will not address
this question, other than to note that a similar association of protest with envi-
ronmental damage is made in much of the pollution havens literature in eco-
nomics.2
Second, while most studies of pollution havens have taken aggregate sta-
tistics to be the relevant data in the determination of what drives siting deci-
sions, I take a more phenomenological approach by examining the actual state-
ments of rm representatives. The cases I examine provide examples of rms
indicating that headaches over environmental protest are a primary factor in
motivating their FDI. I attempt to advance this more political and phenomeno-
logical study through an analysis of two cases in the political economy of Ja-
pan’s relations with Southeast Asia. The rst case takes up the possibility that
Japan’s FDI to Southeast Asia during the 1970s was motivated in part by the
desire (on the part of both rms and the Japanese state) to escape from anti-
pollution protest in Japan. The second asks whether the siting of overseas indus-
trial tree plantations (particularly plantations of the species Eucalyptus
camaldulensis) supplying the Japanese market for wood chips and paper pulp
has been inuenced by the environmental problems those plantations cause.
These cases present useful contrasts for the study of pollution export, varying as
they do in time (the 1970s for manufacturing FDI, the 1980s and 1990s for
plantation forestry), sector (manufacturing vs. forestry), and the location of
protest (Japan vs. Southeast Asia). However, they are similar in that each case
has seen protest against environmental problems and clear statements by rms
that the desire to escape that protest was inuencing their siting decisions.
While the rst case seems to be a fairly straightforward example of rms search-
ing for pollution havens, the second requires more interpretation and indeed
presents a somewhat counterintuitive result.
“Pollution Export” from Japan during the 1970s
Japanese industrialization during the 25 years after World War II was based on
the extremely rapid expansion of heavy and chemical industry with little or no
attention to pollution control. Given the location of much of this industry in
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densely populated areas, it is not surprising that by the mid-1960s the country
was facing an environmental crisis of frightening dimensions.3 The political side
of this crisis manifested itself at the national level, with increasing public con-
cern over pollution putting intense pressure on the ruling Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP) and challenging the consensus over high-speed growth, and at the
grassroots in terms of a remarkable owering of movements opposing local pol-
lution. By the late 1960s, this wave of protest was prompting government and
business to consider new patterns of industrial siting both domestically and in-
ternationally. The fact that these considerations coincided with a rapid increase
in Japan’s FDI in resource—and pollution—intensive projects has led many ob-
servers to assume that the former helped to cause the latter, but little careful
study of this issue has been done.
A consideration of the oil rening and petrochemicals industries suggests
that there is reason to accept the argument. These industries were among those
facing particularly intense protest in Japan at the turn of the 1970s, and also saw
a roughly contemporaneous rapid upturn in FDI projects, particularly to Asia.
While there were various factors pushing the overseas relocation of parts of the
Japanese petrochemical industry (particularly after the 1973 oil shock), state-
ments by both business and government make it clear that the desire to escape
anti-pollution protest was a primary cause of the FDI boom. On the govern-
ment side, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) announced
in June 1970 that it would be establishing a fund to assist the movement of the
petrochemicals industry overseas, and in particular to Southeast Asia. One of
the three reasons cited by MITI for this move was that pollution was making the
establishment of petrochemical facilities more and more difcult.4 These
difculties were also made clear in the industry’s attitude to overseas relocation,
both at an industry-wide level and at the level of individual rms. The Kagaku
Keizai Kenkyûjo (Chemicals Economic Research Institute) stressed in a 1972 re-
port both that domestic protest against the industry was the major reason for
overseas projects and that MITI was encouraging the future overseas movement
of the sector.5 On the latter issue, the report argued that “this is the rst time
MITI has genuinely emphasized the necessity of overseas siting for key resource-
type industries, and should be seen as an epoch-making move by MITI in re-
sponse to environmental problems.”6 It should be noted that the problems fac-
ing domestic petrochemical production were phrased almost entirely in terms
of oppositional citizens’ movements rather than tightening regulatory stan-
dards.
Some sense of the domestic problems facing individual rms may be
gained from an examination of Mitsubishi Oil’s efforts to construct an oil
renery. The company’s original plan envisaged building the renery in Chiba
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Prefecture (near Tokyo), but intense local opposition caused the company to
abandon the plan and to shift its attention to Shibushi Bay in Kagoshima Pre-
fecture, southern Japan. However, intensifying opposition there prompted
Mitsubishi in 1972 to announce an effort to move some of the project to Kin
Bay in Okinawa.7 In July 1970, meanwhile, Mitsubishi announced its desire to
establish an oil renery in Southeast Asia, in part because opposition to air and
water pollution in Japan had made nding a suitable site “extremely difcult”
(kiwamete muzukashii). Interestingly, the plan was criticized on economic
grounds as unlikely to yield a prot, but Mitsubishi felt that it had no choice
given opposition in Japan.8 Mitsubishi subsequently became involved in large-
scale overseas petrochemical projects in Singapore and Thailand. Citizen protest
was thus pushing Mitsubishi Oil’s siting decisions to shift towards increasingly
peripheral (and politically weak) regions of Japan and to Southeast Asia.
Oil rening and petrochemicals were far from the only sectors to face
these problems; similar difculties confronted, and were explicitly acknowl-
edged by, rms in aluminum rening, zinc, steel, and oil storage, among other
industries.9 It is also notable that foreign governments, including those of Peru,
South Korea, and the Philippines, appealed to Japan to relocate some of its
highly-polluting industrial plant to their countries. The documentary evidence
makes it clear that in the early 1970s, Japanese businessmen in pollution-
intensive sectors saw anti-pollution protest as a key reason to relocate to Asia. At
the same time Japanese politicians and bureaucrats were developing policy
measures to assist this process and Asian leaders welcomed the relocation.
Industrial Tree Plantations in Southeast Asia
The industrial tree plantation (ITP) sector provides a good example of the kind
of non-manufacturing sector which, as Jennifer Clapp has argued in this issue,
has not been addressed in the pollution havens debate despite being relevant to
it. ITPs have, over the last 20 years, become a popular response to the scarcity of
natural forest resources. As both tightened regulation and increasing absolute
scarcity have created problems for forestry companies worldwide, more and
more states and rms have turned to planting their own trees in an effort to se-
cure homogenous and reliable sources of supply. ITPs are established more or
less along the lines of industrial farming, relying as they do on “intensive prepa-
ration of the soil, fertilisation, regular spacing of trees, seedling selection, inten-
sive weeding using machines or herbicides, use of pesticides, thinning, mecha-
nised harvesting, and in some cases, pruning.”10 While the agro-industrial
character of these fast-growing plantations has endeared them to paper compa-
Derek Hall 23
7. Nikkan Kôgyô Shinbun, February 22 1972.
8. Nikkan Kôgyô Shinbun, July 18 1970.
9. See, respectively, Nikkan Kôgyô Shinbun, December 5 1971; Nikkan Kôgyô Shinbun, May 31 1971;
Nihon Bengoshi Rengôkai 1991; and Sotoyama 1977.
10. Carrere and Lohmann 1996, 4.
nies, the changes wrought by tree plantations on surrounding environments
have led to political conict over environmental degradation around the world.
Despite the fact that the environmental consequences of ITPs are not captured
by toxic release inventories, these consequences have had important implica-
tions for siting patterns.
The clearest environmental problem caused by ITPs is their impact on hy-
drological cycles. Tree plantations have quite different ratios of water inter-
cepted by foliage to that reaching the ground, of runoff to water inltrating the
soil, and of evapotranspiration to water reaching the subsoil than do mixed for-
ests.11 Eucalypts (popular in Southeast Asian ITPs), in addition, absorb water
from much further underground than do other trees and plants. Plantations
thus unbalance water cycles, with results including reduced water ow through-
out the year, the disappearance of streams during the dry season, and damage to
other ecosystems facing reduced access to water. These environmental changes
create obvious difculties for local farming and have been responsible for a
good deal of the resistance to ITPs. Less obvious but more important are the
consequences of the environmental transformations undertaken in the establish-
ment of ITPs. Although the clearing of natural forest has had catastrophic results
around the world, loggers have not generally needed close control over forest
land before they actually came to log it, and after logging it has often been pos-
sible for local people to expand farming. Tree plantations are very different in
that the creation and maintenance of an articial ecosystem requires long-term,
intensive control over land. In many developing countries, much of the area
which has been marked out for tree plantations is subject to uncertain tenure
and conicting use claims of locals and the state. ITP establishment has thus of-
ten led to the denial of forest resources (such as wild plants or grazing areas) to
local people or to outright coercion and intimidation in land acquisition. Re-
sponses to the arrival of ITPs and the environmental changes that accompany
them have included organized resistance and even violence.
ITPs now play a central role in supplying the Japanese market, and the Jap-
anese pulp and paper industry has had to confront the problems outlined above
in its efforts to site tree plantations overseas. The industry has been interested in
the establishment of overseas tree plantations to meet Japanese demand since
the 1971 formation of the Nanpô Zôrin Kyôkai (Southern Afforestation Associa-
tion), which set up experimental plantations in Malaysia, Indonesia, Papua
New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands during the 1970s and saw Southeast Asia
as the most promising future location for tree plantations.12 While interest in
overseas plantations waned during the early 1980s, by the end of that decade
the booming Japanese paper market and the increased value of the yen led to re-
newed enthusiasm. Industry participants also stress that in the 1980s Japanese
paper companies realized that tightening regulation of forestry in the United
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States and Canada meant that they would have to look elsewhere for re-
sources—a clear case of international location decisions being motivated in part
by environmental regulation.13 From 1989, Japanese companies began setting
up plantations overseas as the paper industry announced a commitment to
source 1/3 of its wood chip consumption from foreign plantations by 2010.14 By
2000, Japanese companies had established 257,600 ha of tree plantations
abroad. However, only one of these was set up in Southeast Asia (Vietnam); new
projects were concentrated in Australia (13 cases), Chile (3), and New Zealand
(2).15
This pattern is surprising not only because of previous Japanese interest in
Southeast Asia as a location for fast-growing tree plantations, but also because
Thailand and Indonesia both embarked during the 1980s on extremely am-
bitious projects for the establishment of ITPs, projects which were inspired in
part by the Japanese paper market. However, in Thailand in particular, anti-
eucalyptus protest has been a major factor in hindering both FDI and domestic
investment in the sector. Northeastern Thailand, for instance, saw widespread
resistance to plantations in the mid-1980s and early 1990s. By 1992 the govern-
ment had cancelled a highly militarized plan to relocate 250,000 families in the
northeast to make way for eucalyptus plantations, and had imposed restrictions
on the development of large-scale ITPs. During this period, several Japanese or
Japan-oriented plantation projects fell victim to protest and political uncer-
tainty, including a Shell project which would have exported 900,000 tons of
wood chips to Japan annually.16 Thai companies have responded to difcult po-
litical and regulatory conditions by moving into neighboring countries such as
Laos.17
Japanese companies interested in setting up overseas ITPs have increas-
ingly recognized the problems that these efforts face in developing countries,
and have reoriented their investment to Australia in particular. This change in
strategy was articulated by industry gures who complained of the difculties
faced in developing countries in securing long-term access to land resources.18 It
is also reected in the 1998 reorganization (with MITI and MAFF support) of
the Nanpô Zôrin Kyôkai into the Kaigai Sangyô Shokurin Sentâ (Japan Overseas
Plantation Center for Plywood), with the conscious change in emphasis from
Southeast Asia to the globe made explicit in the change of name.19 What should
be stressed here is that the difculties in gaining access to land noted by indus-
try sources result not only from the evictions and harassment that frequently ac-
company the establishment of industrial tree plantations, but also from the en-
vironmental changes—the elimination of access to forest products, and the
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depletion of water supplies—that plantations bring about. Ironically, however,
the result of the protest against the environmental transformations caused by
ITPs has been the relocation of the sector away from countries like Thailand and
Indonesia and toward Australia. It appears that, in Australia, the greater security
of tenure (making it easier for Japanese companies to reliably affect the environ-
mental changes they require in order to run an ITP) and the lower population
density around ITPs (thus reducing protest over water issues) has facilitated ITP
establishment.
The implications of this case for the pollution havens literature thus de-
pend upon the way the question of pollution havens is framed. With respect to
the question of whether environmental protest is driving economic activity
from developed to developing countries, this case represents not merely a nega-
tive nding but in fact a nding that runs directly contrary to the expectation:
Japanese companies have here shifted their attention from a less-developed
country to a more-developed one. The reasons for this shift, however, including
as they do the political consequences of the environmental changes brought
about by ITPs, fall squarely within the range of the questions asked at the begin-
ning of this article.
Conclusions
While it is impossible to draw any conclusions for the global study of pollution
havens on the basis of two cases, the analysis presented above raises a number
of interesting issues for the future development of the literature. First, the case of
Japanese FDI in the 1970s makes it clear that pollution export can be a state
strategy. The Japanese government was explicitly funding the transfer of “dirty”
industries abroad. Second, case studies can illuminate aspects of the impact of
environmental problems on siting decisions that are missed by large-n studies.
The disruption of hydrological cycles caused by large-scale industrial tree plan-
tations and the problems it engenders for local agriculture, for instance, would
not be visible to a methodology focusing on toxic release. Third, while the pol-
lution havens literature has generally sought to determine the causes of siting
decisions through regression analysis, my research in both of these cases has re-
vealed a wealth of examples (only some of which can be presented here) of in-
dustry representatives explicitly stating that the desire to escape environmental
protest is one of their major motivations.
It may be, however, that the relative abundance of these statements in the
sectors I address is a result of special characteristics of the cases. With regard to
ITPs, much of the local resistance to their establishment has been conceptual-
ized as conict over land rather than being, as I have argued, related to the envi-
ronmental transformations these plantations bring about. Corporate spokes-
men have thus discussed their location decisions largely in these terms rather
than as an escape from environmental protest. In Japan in the early 1970s, on
the other hand, no major stigma attached to rms stating that they were relocat-
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ing overseas to escape anti-pollution protest; in some cases, rms presented
these actions as demonstrations of their new commitment not to pollute at
home. Indeed, the frankness with which Japanese rms of the early 1970s were
prepared to admit that they were relocating overseas in order to escape domestic
protest is, in retrospect, quite striking. This frankness may be explained in part
by the fact that journalistic interest in Japan’s “pollution export” did not begin
until 1972 and organized opposition only commenced in 1973; by 1974–5, Ja-
pan had an active and well-publicized citizens’ movement opposing the export
of pollution. While the public prominence of this movement likely led rms
and government agencies to become much more circumspect in their public
statements by the mid-1970s, the prior period provides an interesting example
of rms publicly discussing their siting debates without fear of political conse-
quences. In both of the cases I have addressed here, then, special circumstances
made rms less reticent than they might otherwise have been to state that their
siting decisions were based in part on environmental protest. It may be that the
difculty of obtaining this kind of evidence in more “normal” cases will render
this intentional approach to the study of pollution havens of limited value. It is
also possible, of course, that in the absence of a concern for bad press, more
such statements would be made.
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